AI SECURITY ENGINEERING HANDBOOK · 2026

Chapter 04 · Prompt Injection

Standalone study module for LMS delivery and required reading.

FORMAT	USE	SCOPE	AUDIENCE
Standalone PDF	Study module	Single chapter	Learners

CHAPTER 04

Prompt Injection

HANDBOOK STUDY COMPANION: STUDY FRAME

Use this chapter to build vocabulary, judgment, and role-readiness. Pair it with the Field Guide when you need applied actions, checklists, and control execution.

STUDY FOCUS

STUDY FOCUS	WHY IT MATTERS
Direct and indirect prompt injection, context authority tiers, orchestrator enforcement, regression suites, and prompt boundary evidence.	Prompt injection matters when untrusted content can influence model behavior, tool use, retrieved context, or user-facing decisions.

Study Outcomes

- Explain context as an attack surface.
- Distinguish model-level refusal from application-level enforcement.
- Describe regression coverage for prompt, model, and retrieval changes.

DOMAIN MAPPING

RELATED AIPSA DOMAINS	APPLIED NEXT STEP	WORKBENCH INSTRUMENTS	RELATED SERVICES
Prompt Injection and Context Security	Prompt injection and context security	Adversarial Range, RAG Test Harness	AI Product Security Assessment

CERTIFICATION AND ASSESSMENT BOUNDARY

This chapter supports training, diagnostic preparation, scorecards, interviews, and role-readiness evaluation. It does not guarantee credential outcomes.

Production prompt injection risk is less about the user who types "ignore your previous instructions" and more about the document the system retrieves on that user's behalf. Direct injection is visible and gets patched quickly. Indirect injection through retrieved documents, email threads, ticketing system comments, and tool outputs persists because the application treats those sources as trusted evidence, not as possible attack delivery channels. The system's usefulness depends on processing external content; its security depends on limiting what that content can cause.

Direct injection is visible and gets patched quickly. Indirect injection through retrieved documents, email threads, ticketing system comments, and tool outputs persists because the application treats those sources as trusted evidence, not as possible attack delivery channels.

HANDBOOK

The two injection paths demand different defenses. Direct injection comes from the user turn — visible, patchable, and largely addressable through input review. Indirect injection arrives through the documents, emails, and tool outputs the system is designed to process — invisible to the user, persistent in the corpus, and able to reach the model on every relevant query.



FIGURE 1: FIGURE 7: DIRECT VS. INDIRECT PROMPT INJECTION — DIRECT INJECTION ENTERS THROUGH THE USER TURN, INDIRECT INJECTION IS EMBEDDED IN RETRIEVED DOCUMENTS AND CARRIES A HIDDEN ADVERSARIAL INSTRUCTION PATH TO THE MODEL

Not all context segments should carry equal authority. System instructions define the application contract and hold the highest trust. Retrieved content provides evidence for a task and holds the lowest trust. The architecture must enforce these distinctions structurally — so that no retrieved document can override system policy regardless of what it contains.



FIGURE 2: FIGURE 8: CONTEXT TRUST TIERS — SYSTEM INSTRUCTIONS AT THE TOP THROUGH INTERNAL KNOWLEDGE BASE, USER INPUT, AND EXTERNAL/UNTRUSTED CONTENT AT THE BOTTOM, WITH THE INSTRUCTION BOUNDARY MARKING WHERE TRUST LEVELS CHANGE

CORE CONCEPTS

DIRECT VS. INDIRECT INJECTION

Direct injection occurs when a user intentionally provides adversarial instructions in their input to override application behavior. Indirect injection occurs when hostile instructions are embedded in content the application processes — retrieved documents, web pages, emails, ticket comments, calendar entries, tool outputs — and the model treats that content as having more authority than it should. Indirect injection is more dangerous in most production systems because the application is designed to process external content, the user may be unaware, and the adversarial content may be persistent in the corpus.

CONTEXT AUTHORITY TIERS

Every context segment has an implicit authority level that determines how much influence it should have over model behavior. System instructions define the application contract and should have the highest authority. Developer instructions define task scope. User input defines the user's request. Retrieved content provides evidence for the task. Tool outputs report external state. Conversation history provides session context. The architecture must enforce these tiers so that a retrieved document cannot override system policy and a tool output cannot grant new permissions.

ORCHESTRATOR-LEVEL ENFORCEMENT

The model cannot be the sole defense against its own context. Orchestrator-level controls enforce the authority distinctions that the model is expected to respect but cannot guarantee. These controls include: structural prompt templates that make authority tiers explicit, schema validation on model outputs that rejects responses that exceed task boundaries, tool policy enforcement that prevents certain actions regardless of what the model requests, action approval gates, and audit logs that record which context segments influenced which decisions. Defense must operate outside the model's reasoning path.

INJECTION THROUGH TOOL OUTPUTS AND INTEGRATIONS

When an agent calls a tool and receives output, that output enters the next model call as context. If the tool output contains adversarial instructions, the model may follow them as if they were orchestrator guidance. This is especially dangerous when multiple tools are chained: hostile content from one tool can steer the arguments for a subsequent tool. Each tool output must be treated as untrusted content, labeled as such in context, and validated before influencing downstream decisions or tool calls.

REGRESSION COVERAGE FOR INJECTION

Prompt injection defenses are regression problems. Model updates, prompt template changes, retrieval logic changes, and new tool integrations can all introduce or re-expose injection vulnerabilities that were previously addressed. An injection regression suite should test direct injection in the user turn, indirect injection through representative retrieved content, injection

through tool output chains, and context poisoning across conversation turns. The suite runs in CI/CD and blocks the deployment of changes that re-introduce known failure classes.

THE PRACTITIONER'S CHALLENGE

The political challenge is that indirect injection through retrieved content is harder to demonstrate than direct injection. A reviewer can see a direct injection attempt immediately; they have to construct a test to see an indirect injection succeed. This asymmetry means that indirect injection risks are frequently discovered through security review rather than through developer intuition, and direct injection gets disproportionate attention in product security discussions. The practitioner has to move the conversation to the retrieval corpus, the connected integrations, and the tool output chain — the actual production injection surface.

The structural challenge is that injection defenses require collaboration across teams. The application team owns the prompt template and output validation. The platform team owns the retrieval layer and tool integration. The security team owns the injection test suite. The ML team owns model selection and evals. An injection defense that is only applied in one of these layers is incomplete. Defense-in-depth requires all layers to enforce authority independently.

The technical challenge is that injection cannot be fully prevented through pattern matching. The attack space is unbounded: instructions can be rephrased, encoded, semantically embedded, delivered across multiple chunks, or carried through tool responses. The correct frame is not "detect all injection attempts" but "limit what injected content can cause." That shift — from input detection to impact reduction — produces more durable defenses.

HOW TO APPROACH IT

- Start by mapping every context input path. List every segment that enters the model's context: system instructions, developer instructions, user input, retrieved chunks, tool outputs, cached responses, and conversation history. For each segment, document the source, the trust level it should carry, the current structural enforcement that limits its authority, and what would happen if it contained adversarial instructions. This map becomes the injection threat model.

- Design context templates that enforce authority tiers structurally. Use labeled sections, XML-style delimiters, or structured prompt formats that make source and authority explicit. The template should make it technically difficult for retrieved content to appear in the same position as system instructions. While the model cannot guarantee it will always interpret these correctly under adversarial conditions, structural separation combined with output validation substantially reduces the attack surface.

- Specify output validation as a required control, not an optional layer. For every model call in the application workflow, define what a valid response looks like: expected schema, permitted action types, allowed reference scope, and required evidence format. Schema validation that runs after generation and rejects out-of-schema responses catches a large class of injection outcomes without relying on the model to self-limit.

- Build the indirect injection test suite before launch. Create test documents that contain injection attempts in formats the system actually retrieves: knowledge base articles, support tickets, email threads, calendar entries, and web content. For each test, define expected behavior — "the model summarizes the document as data, not as instruction" — and a pass/fail criterion. Store the test suite in version control alongside the application code and run it on every change that affects prompts, retrieval, model selection, or tool integrations.

- Enforce tool policy independently of model reasoning. For each tool the agent can call, define the conditions under which the call is permitted: user has requested it in this turn, it falls within the task scope, the arguments match expected schema. Do not allow the model to authorize tool calls that the orchestrator has not independently validated. This breaks the confused-deputy pattern where injected content steers the model to authorize a tool call that the user never requested.

OUTPUTS AND DELIVERABLES

- The design artifacts are the **injection threat model**, **context authority-tier specification**, and **prompt template security review**. The injection threat model identifies every context input path, the trust level of each, the current structural enforcement, and the worst-case impact if each segment contains adversarial content. The authority-tier specification documents what authority each context segment carries and which controls enforce the tier boundaries. The prompt template review evaluates the current template against the authority-tier specification and identifies where structural separation is insufficient.

- The enforcement artifacts are the **output validation schema**, **tool call authorization policy**, and **orchestrator control specification**. The output validation schema defines valid response formats for each model call in the workflow. The tool call authorization policy defines the conditions under which each tool call is permitted, independent of model reasoning. The orchestrator control specification documents all controls that operate outside model reasoning to limit injection impact.

- The testing and evidence artifacts are the **indirect injection test suite**, **injection regression pipeline configuration**, and **injection control evidence package**. The test suite covers direct injection, indirect injection through each retrieval source type, tool output injection, and cross-turn context poisoning. The pipeline configuration integrates the suite into CI/CD with defined failure actions. The evidence package stores test results across versions, supporting release gate decisions and customer assurance requests.

COMMON FAILURE MODES

- **Direct-Only Focus:** The injection defense reviews user input and ignores the retrieval corpus, tool outputs, and connected integrations. This catches demonstration attacks while leaving production risk largely unaddressed. Fix: build indirect injection tests for every content source the system processes.
- **Model-As-Sole-Defense:** The prompt tells the model to ignore instructions in retrieved content and treat external sources as data. This works until the model encounters a well-crafted injection or is updated in a way that changes its context handling. Fix: add orchestrator-level enforcement that operates independently of model reasoning.
- **Test Suite Divergence:** The injection test suite covers direct attacks from the launch period but has not been updated when new tools were added, the retrieval corpus changed, or the model version changed. The suite turns green while new injection surfaces go untested. Fix: require injection test suite updates as part of any change to prompts, retrieval, models, or tools.
- **Pattern Filter Over-Reliance:** The injection defense is a filter that blocks known jailbreak phrases. Novel indirect injection that does not match known patterns bypasses it entirely. Fix: shift the defense layer from input detection to impact reduction through schema validation, tool policy enforcement, and authority tier enforcement.

IMPLEMENTATION CHECKLIST

- [ ] Map every context input path and assign a trust level to each segment.
- [ ] Design prompt templates that enforce authority tier separation structurally.
- [ ] Specify output validation schemas for each model call in the application workflow.
- [ ] Define tool call authorization policy independent of model reasoning for each tool.
- [ ] Build an indirect injection test suite covering each content source type before launch.
- [ ] Integrate the injection test suite into CI/CD with defined blocking conditions.
- [ ] Test tool output injection in agent workflows with chained tool calls.
- [ ] Require injection test suite updates for changes to prompts, retrieval, model versions, or tool integrations.

RELATED READING

- Handbook chapters: Chapter 2 (Architecture and Trust Boundaries) for context trust tier design; Chapter 5 (RAG Authorization) for retrieval-layer defenses; Chapter 6 (Agentic Permissions) for tool authorization and agent action chains.
- Field Guide: Prompt Injection and Context Security for context authority checks, indirect injection tests, and regression evidence.